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Abstract 
 
Differing parental considerations for girls and boys in households are a primary cause of the 
gender gap in school enrolment and educational attainment in developing countries, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.  While a number of studies have focused 
on the inequality of educational opportunities in South Asia, little is known about Bhutan.  
This study uses recent household expenditure data from the Bhutan Living Standard Survey 
to evaluate the gender gap in allocation of resources for schooling.  The findings, based on 
cross-sectional as well as household fixed effect approaches suggest that girls are less likely 
to enroll in school but are not allocated fewer resources once they are enrolled.   
 
Keywords: Gender bias; education inequality; Two-part model 
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1.  Introduction 
Economists who have investigated the intra-household allocation of education, health and 
nutritional intake have documented significant gender bias in the allocation of resources in 
most developing countries.  For instance, Pandey et al. (2002) and Asfaw, Klasen, & 
Lamanna (2010) find that parents in India wait longer to hospitalise a girl child than a boy 
and dig deeper into their pocket to hospitalise a boy than a girl when they are sick.  Similarly, 
there exists substantial evidence of gender bias in schooling of children – school enrolment 
and expenditure for girls is found to be significantly lower than boys in many developing 
countries (see for example, Zimmermann, 2012, Himaz, 2010, Aslam and Kingdon, 2008, 
Kingdon, 2005, 2002, Dreze & Kingdon, 2001).   
Yet there has been no study, to the best of our knowledge that evaluates this issue for 
Bhutan.  Towards that end, we investigate the nature of household allocation of educational 
expenditure in Bhutan.  The case for Bhutan is specifically intriguing as it is one of the few 
developing countries to invest heavily on education (16% of total expenditure) and health 
(7% of total expenditure)
i
.  It is also one of the countries to have met the global 20:20 
commitment that requires all developing countries to allocate 20 percent of their national 
budget to basic social programs.  The government in Bhutan believes education is an 
essential tool to empower people and relies on its provision as a strategy to alleviate poverty 
in the long run.  Nonetheless, the impact of such policies, particularly on the existence of a 
gender gap has not been evaluated appropriately.
ii
  
An investigation of the gender gap in resource allocation in developing countries 
remains a challenge due to the non-availability of individual level data, particularly on 
education and health expenditure of children.  Accordingly, many previous studies have 
employed the Engle curve approach, which allows for the use of household level data to 
analyse the gender gap.  However, this approach has been called into question as it has been 
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inadequate in detecting a gender gap even when widespread discrimination against girls exist 
(Kingdon, 2005).  Recent studies have utilised the Two-part model when individual data is 
available and confirm better performance than the Engel curve in detecting gender bias.
iii
  
If parents’ decision to spend on education is separable from how the expenditure is 
allocated, a gender bias may only be evident in investigations of individual outcomes using a 
two-stage model.  Specifically, the allocation may be potentially biased in two ways: (a) in 
the decision to spend on a boy but not a girl, and (b) in deciding to spend less on a girl than 
on a boy conditional on spending positive amounts on both children.  Averaging across the 
two effects may mute the biases if it occurs through only one channel rather than both, or if 
gender biases in the two channels operate in opposite directions.
iv
 The two-part methodology 
allows one to separate the household’s decision to incur any expenditure from how resources 
are actually spent across gender by modelling each stage separately (Wooldridge, 2010).  
While this strategy enables us to detect the existence of a gender gap, it relies purely on 
observable attributes for identification.  Alternatively, a household fixed effect model allows 
for identification based on unobservable characteristics that are common to children 
belonging to the same household.  The richness of the Bhutan Living Standard Survey 
enables us to first ‘unpack’ the gender bias in the schooling of children into the ‘enrolment’ 
and ‘spending’ components using a two-part methodology on the pooled data, and 
additionally control for the effect of household-specific unobservables for better 
identification.
v
   
 Our findings support the existence of a significant gender bias in the decision to enrol 
children in school that varies with the age of the child: the likelihood of a 10-13 year old 
being enrolled in school is higher than both the younger and older age groups.  Thus a gender 
bias in favour of educating boys in Bhutan is mostly demonstrated through non-enrolment 
rather than expenditure on schooling once children are enrolled.  The shortcoming of using 
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cross-sectional models is evident when comparing our results from the pooled data to those 
obtained by controlling for household effects.  The gender bias in school enrolment is almost 
twice in both the linear fixed effect and probit random effect models, implying that the 
allocation of resources may indeed reflect intra-household bias.   
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  A description of the data and variables are 
provided in Section 2.  Section 3 briefly outlines the empirical model.  Section 4 presents the 
estimation results and section 5 concludes with a policy oriented discussion.    
 
2.  Data Description 
The Bhutan Living Standard Survey (BLSS) is a nationwide household survey which was 
administered by the National Statistics Bureau (NSB), Royal Government of Bhutan in 2007.  
It is modelled after the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) conducted by the 
World Bank.  The survey adopted a two-staged stratified sampling procedure in which the 
primary and secondary strata comprised of districts (‘dzongkhag’ in Bhutanese) and urban-
rural areas, respectively.  The primary sampling units (PSUs) were blocks for urban areas and 
cluster of villages (‘chiwogs’ in Bhutanese) for rural areas, while the secondary sampling 
units (SSUs) were households.  The BLSS used an integrated household questionnaire to 
collect information covering consumption expenditure, assets, housings, education, health, 
fertility and prices of varying commodities.  The survey records schooling information and 
health expenditure at the individual level.  With an impressive response rate of 98 percent, 
the nationally representative sample consists of 49,165 individuals in 9,798 households.
vi
 
Originally the survey sought to study poverty and was used for developing the government of 
Bhutan’s Poverty Analysis Report, 2007.  The dataset has been used to estimate 
multidimensional poverty by Santos & Ura (2008), but otherwise remains largely 
unexploited.   
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2.1.  Outcomes of Interest 
 In order to estimate the gender differential, we construct two outcomes of interest: (a) 
a binary dependent variable, Enrolled, using the reported status on current attendance, and (b) 
schooling Expenditure of the enrolled children in both levels and logarithms.
vii
  School 
expenditure is restricted to positive and not exceeding Ngultrum (Nu.) 15000 as only 0.5% of 
the sample reported expenditure greater than Nu.15000.  Schooling expenses are an aggregate 
of the token fee, boarding fee, spending on books and supplies, private tutoring fees, 
transportation expenses and other school related expenditures.
viii
 
 
2.2.  Explanatory variables 
 A variety of socio-economic variables are used to control for individual, household 
and regional characteristics that determine schooling outcomes of children.   
Individual: The main variable of interest is the child’s gender.  While the inclusion of child’s 
age is necessary, Zimmermann (2012) and Lancaster et al (2006) find significant gender 
discrimination in educational expenditure for older children aged 10 and above, and none for 
younger children.  A preliminary look at the enrolment rates in Figure 1 reveals variation in 
both the trend and gender gap across age.  Similar to the findings in Zimmermann (2012) and 
Lancaster et al (2006), the bias in enrolment seems to favour the oldest males the most.  
Hence, to capture age-specific gender bias in schooling we use three age categories and their 
interactions with the female dummy.  In keeping with the trends evident in Figure 1, all 
school-age children between 6 and 16 years old are categorised as being in primary (6-9 years 
old), middle (10-13 years old) and high (14-16 years old) school.  Our final sample consists 
of 12,879 children.   
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Household: The decision to enrol children in school depends critically on intra-household 
dynamics, particularly in developing countries where compulsory schooling is not enforced.  
We use the wealth index of the household, education, gender and marital status of the 
household head, and the number of dependents, as proxies for socioeconomic status. 
 The wealth index is constructed using principal components as outlined in Filmer and 
Prichett (2001).  While the role of income in determining educational attainment and 
schooling is undisputed (Baluch & Shahid, 2009, Tansel, 2002), a host of measurement issues 
hinder the use of income or consumption expenditures, especially in developing countries 
(Sahn and Stifle, 2003).  An asset based metric is considered to be a superior measure in 
these countries as the assets are few and easy to measure.  We use three asset indicators - 
housing quality, household durables, and productive assets - to construct a standardised 
wealth index.  The main results from the principal components analysis are presented in 
Table 5 in the Appendix.  A comparison of the wealth index for the poorest 40%, middle 40% 
and top 20% reveals they are reasonably comparable to reported expenditures mainly for the 
middle 40%.  For some assets, the index underestimates expenditures for the poorest 40% and 
overestimates for the rich 20%. 
 The majority of people in Bhutan reside within a joint-family system.  In recognition 
of the significant role played by the head of household under this family structure, we rely 
upon the educational attainment, gender and marital status of household heads instead of 
parents.  We briefly discuss each of these covariates below.   
 Educated parents are more likely to be economically active implying greater 
affordability to spend on children.  This has been widely documented in studies by 
Duraisamy (1992), Drèze and Kingdon (2001), Khanam (2008) and Tansel (2002), among 
others.  In particular, the positive effect of parental education on child schooling was found to 
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be larger for girls in India (Drèze and Kingdon, 2001) and Turkey (Tansel, 2002).  We use 5 
categories of educational attainment for the household head as detailed in Table 1.   
 Next, a dummy for female head of household is intended to capture the role of 
maternal decision-making power in the household.  In traditional societies, women’s 
autonomy imparted by either education or income share, determines her ability to access 
economic resources.  Property distribution constitutes an important factor in that regard, and 
unlike other South Asian countries Bhutan presents a unique case in being a matrilineal 
society where women inherit landed property.  An estimated 50% of land-registered titles are 
recorded in favour of women, and according to a gender pilot study (RGoB, 2001), a 60:40 
female–male land and property ownership ratio prevails in rural areas.  In our sample, 29.6 
percent of households are headed by females and while these households are poorer than their 
male-headed counterparts, they own more (wet and dry) land.  While the evidence on the 
relationship between female empowerment and children’s health outcomes is well established 
(e.g., Thomas, 1990, Haddad and Hoddinot, 1994, Maitra, 2004, Maitra & Rammohan, 
2011), less is known about its effect on children’s education or on existing gender inequity in 
household investments on schooling.  Among the latter, there exists no consensus on whether 
the gender gap in schooling is exacerbated or reduced when women have more autonomy in 
the household (e.g., Qian, 2008, Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003).  Handa (1996) shows that 
even though female headed households have comparatively lower economic status, they 
allocate more for children.  Additionally, we control for marital status of the household head 
with a priori expectation that marital instability can be disruptive to educational outcomes of 
children. 
 The size of the household is another important household characteristic to consider.  
While larger households may benefit from economies of scale accruing from shared 
household goods (Aslam & Kingdon, 2008, Kingdon, 2005), more dependents can cause a 
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setback to the educational prospects of children.  Competition for household resources and 
increased burden of household chores associated with more dependents, are likely to diminish 
the possibility of enrolment, especially for girls.
ix
  
Regional: Rural and urban areas, especially in developing countries, differ widely in the 
availability of schools and educational facilities offered.  Besides, household characteristics 
in rural regions are likely to differ from urban areas in several ways.  For example, the degree 
of exposure and awareness of the benefits of education, and the allocation of formal and 
informal forms of work to children might vary across rural and urban areas.  We include a 
rural dummy to control for such regional variation in schooling outcomes.   
 Table 1 reports the variable descriptions and summary statistics for the estimation 
sample.  Girls constitute approximately 51% of our sample with the remaining 49% being 
boys.  79% of all children are enrolled in school with boys showing an enrolment rate of 80% 
against 78% for girls.  Parents spend slightly more than 2% on boys than girls.  Most children 
belong to the middle-school age group (10-13 years).  Each household has 3 dependents on 
average and 74% of the households reside in rural areas.  Almost 72% households have heads 
with no educational attainment, with less than 5% having attended college or beyond.  85% 
of heads are married, and 30% of households are headed by females.  Furthermore, Figure 1 
shows a steadily increasing trend in enrolment rates for both males and females up to age 10 
where after they decline.  The gender gap in enrolment favour boys throughout and is found 
to be highest among children of high-school age. 
 
3.  Estimation Strategy 
 Let s be a binary variable that determines the schooling participation decision, and y* 
denote a continuous latent variable determining schooling expenditure.  The observed 
expenditure y is then generated as y = s.y*.  When the mechanisms determining s and y* are 
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independent conditional on explanatory variables x, the parameters of the resulting two-part 
model proposed by Cragg (1971) can be estimated by a first stage probit followed by 
truncated normal regression (Wooldridge, 2010).  Additionally, Cragg (1971) suggested a 
lognormal distribution can be used instead, and the resulting model has been studied in detail 
by Duan et al. (1984). The participation decision is still governed by a probit model, while 
the latent variable y* has a lognormal distribution:    
P(s = 1 | x) = Φ(xγ)        (1) 
y* = exp(xβ + u)        (2) 
where x represents the vector of explanatory variables discussed in section 2.2.  The resulting 
equation for expenditure can be written as y = 1[xγ + v > 0] exp(xβ + u), where u and v are 
independent, and u|x ~ Normal(0, 2 ), implying that the distribution of y conditional on (x, y 
> 0) is lognormal.
x
  Maximum likelihood estimation of the log-likelihood function, 
                       iiiiiiiii yxyyxyxyl loglogloglog01log011log01    
is straightforward as it separates into two parts with no loss in efficiency (McDowell, 2003). 
The first is probit of si on xi to estimate γ, and then β is estimated using an OLS regression of 
log(yi) on xi for observations with yi > 0 (Wooldridge, 2010, pp. 695, Cameron and Trivedi, 
2005, pp. 545).
xi
   
 Next, we deal with the potential endogeneity in our estimation equations arising from 
the correlation of unobservables that do not vary across child gender, such as social norms, 
traits, values and overall outlook of the household, and distance to school, with the 
explanatory variables.  Estimation of household fixed effect is a convincing way of 
examining whether gender gap in educational opportunities is a ‘within-household’ 
phenomenon. The comparison of cross-sectional and household fixed effect estimates sheds 
light on whether the gender gap is a result of intra-household schooling decision or just an 
indication of boy-girl differences across households.   
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Controlling for the household fixed effect, the decision to enrol children in school, 
and the conditional log of schooling expenditure are re-estimated.  Additionally a linear 
random effects probit model is estimated for the first step as an alternative to compare the 
results from the cross-sectional probit.
xii
  Controlling for household fixed effects imply that 
only coefficients of variables that vary across households, namely the child’s age and gender 
effects can be estimated.  Hence we use interactions of gender with all the time invariant 
characteristics to analyse discrimination against females attributable to other household 
characteristics. The relationships estimated using fixed effects are as follows: 
 
where     denote schooling outcomes of child i living in the household j, ijX is a vector of 
individual characteristics and interactions of gender and gender-invariant household 
characteristics, and    represents the household fixed effect.   
 
4.  Results 
The main estimation results are presented in Tables 2 and 3.  In Table 2, we report the 
marginal effects from the probit estimates of school enrolment in columns (1a) and (1b), and 
the coefficients from the regression of expenditure in logarithms, conditional on enrolment, in 
columns (2a) and (2b).  Allowing for within-household effects on enrolment yields the results 
in columns (1) and (2), while the estimates for log expenditure are reported in column (3) in 
Table 3. 
 
4.1.  Cross-sectional (Pooled) Model 
Currently enrolled 
(3)                                               ijijjij XY  
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We begin with a discussion of the marginal effects for the probability of being enrolled in 
school followed by regression estimates of log school expenditure.  Our findings confirm the 
presence of gender discrimination in school enrolment.  The probability of enrolling in school 
is around 3% lower for girls.  Additionally, age is an important determinant that significantly 
but non-monotonically affects enrolment probability.  Compared to the youngest group aged 
6-9 years, children aged 10-13 are almost 4% more likely to enrol while the oldest group 
aged 14-16 years are 10.8% less likely to enrol in schools.  The marginal effect of the 
interaction term is statistically significant and 4% lower for females in the 14-16 age group.  
This implies that the gender bias against female school enrolment can be largely explained by 
discrimination against the oldest females.  The fact that girls are less likely to enrol 
particularly at higher ages confirms the findings in the literature discussed earlier (see 
Zimmermann, 2012, Lancaster et al, 2006).   
 Our analysis also indicates significant roles for household characteristics such as the 
number of dependents and wealth.  The presence of an additional dependent lowers the 
chances of enrolment by less than 1%.  Wealth has strong economic and statistical 
significance – a standard deviation increase in the wealth index raises the chances of school 
attendance by more than 10%.  This result is consonant with the finding in studies conducted 
by the Ministry of Education in Bhutan where poverty of parents has been pinpointed as a 
major cause for not enrolling children in schools (Subedi and Nepal, 2010).  Further, of the 
1,939 children who responded to the question “why they are not in school” in the NSB 
(2007), 15% answered “they could not afford it”.  These facts underline the importance of 
economic status as a determinant of school enrolment in Bhutan. 
 Turning to the impact of the head of household attributes, the influence of gender, 
educational attainment and marital status of the household head are significant in determining 
school enrolment.  As can be expected, we find that education raises the child’s probability of 
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enrolment significantly, but only for those children with heads having 5-8 years of education.  
On the contrary when household heads have attended college or beyond (13-18), the effect is 
significantly negative and seems to discourage enrolment by more than 12%.
xiii
  Female 
household head and married heads have significant positive effects confirming prior 
expectations that maternal autonomy and presence of both parents promote children’s 
wellbeing and schooling.  Finally, the rural dummy capturing the impact of regional 
inequality is found to deter enrolment in rural areas by almost 4%. 
 
School Expenditure 
The fact that females face discrimination in educational opportunities is no longer supported 
when considering expenditure on schooling.  However, age of child continues to be a 
significant determinant of expenditure albeit in a different manner than enrolment.  
Specifically, school expenditure is monotonically increasing with child age.  Compared to the 
youngest group, expenditures rise by 29% for the 10-13 years old children and nearly 77% 
for the 14-16 year age-group.  Since parents are resource constrained, competition for 
resources particularly at the higher age-group when school expenses increase substantially, is 
likely to bias allocation in favour of boys.  The prevalence of such practice cannot be denied 
given the 20% gender gap in adult literacy rate (see footnote 2), but does not find adequate 
support in our sample.
xiv
   
 Among the household characteristics, household wealth continues to play a major role 
in supporting educational expenses.  However, conditional on enrolment, the presence of 
dependents do not affect allocation of expenses for education.  Attributes of the head of 
household remain economically and statistically significant determinants.  Despite the fact 
that participation of women in household decision making is limited, they have a significant 
role to play when acting as the head of the household.  In stark contrast to our findings for 
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enrolment, the influence of the head’s educational attainment seems less controversial.  More 
educated heads allocate more resources for education.  This holds for a majority of the   
categories of head’s education with the most educated spending almost 28% more than heads 
with no education.  Thus, the positive impact of head’s education is observed in terms of 
expenditure once the child is enrolled, and not on the probability of enrolment itself.  Finally, 
children in rural areas enjoy over 5% reduction in schooling expenses compared to urban 
residents as can be expected owing to higher cost of living and transportation in urban 
areas.
xv
  
 
4.2.  Household Effect Models 
Currently Enrolled – Fixed Effect Linear and Random Effect Probit 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of linear fixed effect and random effect probit for 
currently enrolled children in columns 1 and 2, respectively.  Our conclusions regarding the 
role of gender and age remain unchanged from the cross-sectional model.  The bias in female 
enrolment can be largely explained by discrimination against the oldest females aged 14-16.  
Using both linear fixed effect and probit random effects, the bias against 14-16 year old 
females is almost twice than that found in the cross sectional model.
xvi
  Wealth continues to 
play a significant and strong role in boosting enrolment of females.  A one standard deviation 
increase in the wealth index is found to have the largest impact (11%) in the random effects 
model. Competition for resources among additional dependents deters female enrolment, 
while having a female head of the household increases the likelihood of female enrolment by 
7%.   
Similar to our earlier findings, higher educational attainment of the head reduces 
female enrolment by upto 30% in the random effects model, and this holds true for 
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households having heads with (9-12) years of education in addition to the college educated 
heads.  However, the marginal effect for boys is positive and mostly significant, and also 
significant for the most educated group of heads (p-value < 0.01) when servants are 
excluded.
xvii
 The large marginal effects observed here indicate the possibility that smaller 
negative effects reported in Table 2 for all children can be explained by the overly negative 
bias against female children.  Marital status and rural residence seems to have no effect on 
the enrolment of females in either model. 
 
School Expenditure: Fixed Effect  
There is no evidence of a gender gap in school expenditure once we control household 
effects.  We do however continue to find that schooling costs more for older children with as 
much as 78% more for the 14-16 year olds.  This substantial increase in school expenditure 
may adversely affect girls as parents are more likely to discontinue their education when it 
becomes very expensive.  The result corroborates our findings for enrolment which imply 
that parents may indeed withdraw girls from school owing to prohibitively high costs at the 
high school level.  Once again, discrimination against females is evident only at the 
enrolment decision and not on spending on their education once enrolled for households that 
have college educated heads. 
 
5.  Policy implications and discussion 
This study is a first attempt to examine the gender gap in schooling of children in Bhutan.  
Economists have tested the hypothesis that girls face discrimination in the intra-household 
allocation of education and health resources in many developing countries.  Studies on some 
South Asian nations like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have proven the existence of pro-
male bias in household resource allocation.  The case for Bhutan has received scant attention 
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mainly due to the non-availability of appropriate data.  Being the forerunner of the concept of 
maximising Gross National Happiness that has drawn substantial attention from economists 
around the world, focussing on Bhutan especially with an aim towards the evaluation of 
gender based educational inequities seems warranted.  We utilise recently available data from 
the Bhutan Living Standard Survey containing rich individual and household level data to 
evaluate outcomes based on two school-related measures that reflect parental preferences in 
the allocation of resources.   
A number of policy implications arise from our analysis.  First, age is a major 
deterrent for enrolment of the oldest children aged 14-16 in school.  Moreover the gender gap 
in enrolment is attributable largely to its prevalence for this age group.  Our analysis shows 
an increase in enrolment for ages 10-13 indicating that a problem of late enrolment is likely.  
Enforcement of enrolment at an appropriate age would enable children to attain more years of 
schooling, particularly benefitting girls in rural areas who are more likely to enrol late and 
leave school early.  Second, wealth being an important factor determining the schooling of 
children, policy interventions that provide appropriate incentive for poorer households to 
enrol their children in school is necessary.  Closing the gap between rural and urban 
enrolment by boosting infrastructural facilities is another target that policy makers need to 
achieve.  Third, female autonomy in the household is found to be beneficial for children’s 
educational outcomes in general, and plays a major role in promoting enrolment of girls.  
Hence a deepening gender gap in schooling forebodes worsening of children’s wellbeing in 
the years to come making it imperative that specific policy measures be undertaken to 
alleviate the gap.   
Overall, our analysis indicates that girls in Bhutan are deprived of opportunities to 
obtain education.  The limited resources of poor households get rationed in their decision to 
send girls to school rather than spending on their schooling needs once they attend school.  
17 
 
This trend has serious implications not only for the educational attainment of these children 
when they turn into adults, but through the positive role played by empowered women in 
influencing their children’s outcomes.  While we find no evidence of discrimination in 
educational expenses against girls conditional on enrolment, our results provide sufficient 
reason for targeted policy intervention in increasing schooling opportunities for females.  
Further exploration of the underlying reasons for the gender bias is beyond the scope of this 
paper and remains an avenue for future research.  An interesting dimension, for instance, 
would entail in-depth socio-economic analysis of the changing nature of the marriage market 
in Bhutan.   
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Table 1. Description of Variables 
Variable Description Mean     SD 
Dependent Variables       
Enrolled  
       Male 
       Female 
Dummy for currently attending  school  0.790 
0.803 
0.778 
0.407 
0.398 
0.416 
School expenditure (level) 
       Male 
       Female 
Expenditure on schooling 1156.480 
1170.064 
1143.306 
1418.669 
1437.659 
1399.992 
Ln School Expenditure Log of school expenditure 6.956 0.884 
 
Explanatory Variables    
Female Dummy for female child  0.507 0.500 
Age  Child age 11.152 3.133 
    Primary-school age (6-9) Dummy for children aged 6 – 9 years  0.337 0.473 
    Middle-school age (10-13) Dummy for children aged 10 – 13 years 0.382 0.486 
    High-school age ( 14-16) Dummy for children aged 14 – 16 years 0.281 0.450 
Wealth Wealth index  -0.051 1.003  
Rural Dummy for rural residence 0.739 0.439 
Household head education:  
       None 
       1-4 years 
       5-8 years 
       9-12 years 
       13-18 years 
Dummy for no education  
Dummy for 1-4 years education 
Dummy for 5-8 years education 
Dummy for 9-12 years education 
Dummy for 13 or more years education 
0.716 
0.066 
0.090 
0.082 
0.046 
0.451 
0.248 
0.286 
0.274 
0.210 
Marital status Dummy for household head’s marital status 0.848 0.360 
Female head Dummy for female head of households 0.296 0.456 
Dependents Number of dependents in household 3.063 1.613 
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Table 2. Gender Gap in School Enrolment and Expenditure: Cross-sectional Analysis 
 Enrolment 
Probit 
(marginal effects) 
Log School Expenditure 
OLS 
(conditional on enrolment) 
 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
Female  -0.029*** -0.018 -0.011 -0.036 
  (0.007) (0.012) (0.016) (0.027) 
Age (10-13) 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.292*** 0.264*** 
  (0.008) (0.012) (0.019) (0.026) 
Age (14-16) -0.108*** -0.086*** 0.768*** 0.764*** 
  (0.010) (0.014) (0.021) (0.029) 
Female*age (10-13) 
 
0.003 
 
0.056 
  
(0.017) 
 
(0.037) 
Female*age (14-16) 
 
-0.039** 
 
0.009 
  
(0.019) 
 
(0.041) 
Wealth 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.201*** 0.200*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) 
Rural -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.052*** -0.053*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.021) (0.021) 
Education of Head (1-4 years) 0.006 0.006 0.088*** 0.088*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.030) (0.030) 
Education of Head (5-8 years) 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.032 0.032 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.026) (0.026) 
Education of Head (9-12 years) 0.002  0.001 0.155*** 0.155*** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.029) (0.029) 
Education of Head (13-18 years) -0.124*** -0.125*** 0.278*** 0.278*** 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.038) (0.038) 
Number of dependents -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006 -0.006 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
Female Head  0.019** 0.019** 0.095*** 0.095*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.020) (0.020) 
Marital status of Head 0.023** 0.023** -0.015 -0.015 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.025) (0.025) 
F/ Wald chi2 1008.77*** 1016.54*** 237.90*** 204.35*** 
Pr(F>f) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 12891 12891 10004 10004 
R-squared/ Pseudo R2 0.093 0.094 0.203 0.203 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. */**/*** denote significance levels 
at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 levels. 
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Table 3. Gender Gap in School Enrolment and Expenditure: Within-household Analysis 
 
Enrolment Log School 
 
Fixed Effect 
(Linear) 
Random Effect 
(Probit) 
Expenditure 
Fixed Effect 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Female  -0.043 0.023 -0.041 
  (0.036) (0.024) (0.059) 
Age (10-13) 0.033** 0.035*** 0.296*** 
 
(0.014) (0.011) (0.022) 
Age (14-16) -0.091*** -0.090*** 0.784*** 
  (0.016) (0.014) (0.026) 
Female* age (10-13) -0.011 -0.001 -0.015 
 
(0.020) (0.017) (0.032) 
Female*age (14-16) -0.065*** -0.059*** -0.045 
 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.038) 
Female*wealth 0.049*** 0.113*** -0.001 
  (0.012) (0.009) (0.019) 
Female*rural 0.037 -0.000 0.029 
  (0.027) (0.019) (0.040) 
Female*education of Head (1-4 
years) 
0.012 
(0.034) 
0.021 
(0.021) 
0.028 
(0.057) 
Female*education of Head (5-8 
years) 
-0.002 
(0.031) 
0.039** 
(0.018) 
-0.027 
(0.047) 
Female*education of Head (9-12 
years) 
-0.056 
(0.037) 
-0.080*** 
(0.032) 
-0.035 
(0.055) 
Female*education of Head (13-18 
years) 
-0.138*** 
(0.050) 
-0.270*** 
(0.048) 
0.200*** 
(0.078) 
Female* number of dependents -0.008 -0.008** 0.000 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.009) 
Female* female Head 0.069*** 0.042*** 0.012 
  (0.020) (0.011) (0.033) 
Female * marital status of Head 0.026 0.014 0.007 
  (0.026) (0.015) (0.044) 
F/ Wald chi2 23.02*** 580.55*** 124.34*** 
Pr(F>f) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 12891 12891 10004 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. */**/*** denote significance levels 
at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 levels. 
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Appendix 
Table 5. Scoring Factors and the Summary Statistics (Main result of PCA) 
Variables Score Mean SD Score Factor/SD 
     
Number of rooms>2.39 rooms 0.084 0.501 0.500 0.169 
Type of floor materials 0.042 0.369 0.482 0.088 
Drinking water source 0.115 0.562 0.496 0.232 
Type of toilet 0.150 0.288 0.453 0.332 
Fuel used for cooking 0.118 0.222 0.416 0.284 
Curry cooker 0.153 0.482 0.500 0.305 
Mobile phone 0.157 0.388 0.487 0.322 
Choesham 0.079 0.514 0.500 0.158 
Water boiler 0.170 0.461 0.499 0.341 
Television 0.169 0.370 0.483 0.351 
Radio 0.032 0.623 0.485 0.065 
Wristwatch 0.076 0.731 0.443 0.171 
Own > 6 Cattle -0.065 0.207 0.406 -0.160 
Own > 4 Poultry -0.073 0.194 0.395 -0.185 
Own >1.69 Acres Land -0.065 0.250 0.433 -0.151 
 
Table 6. Comparison of Wealth Index and Total Expenditure  
Variables Wealth Index (Mean) Expenditure (Mean) 
 
Poor      
40% 
Middle         
40% 
Rich    
20% 
Poor      
40% 
Middle         
40% 
Rich    
20% 
Rent> Nu. 1309.7/month 0.050 0.316 0.862 0.068 0.355 0.744 
Number of rooms>2.39 rooms 0.289 0.561 0.804 0.299 0.566 0.773 
Type of floor materials 0.289 0.370 0.526 0.135 0.282 0.356 
Drinking water source 0.284 0.647 0.949 0.396 0.604 0.810 
Type of toilet 0.016 0.261 0.887 0.092 0.326 0.603 
Fuel used for cooking 0.014 0.229 0.627 0.074 0.249 0.466 
Curry cooker 0.059 0.679 0.933 0.241 0.565 0.796 
Mobile phone 0.031 0.472 0.934 0.110 0.461 0.797 
Choesham 0.312 0.587 0.772 0.346 0.562 0.753 
Water boiler 0.016 0.647 0.980 0.183 0.552 0.835 
Television 0.008 0.435 0.969 0.113 0.425 0.775 
Radio 0.543 0.657 0.718 0.524 0.663 0.745 
Wristwatch 0.565 0.794 0.940 0.596 0.791 0.883 
Own > 6 Cattle 0.323 0.187 0.018 0.233 0.228 0.114 
Own > 4 Poultry 0.341 0.135 0.014 0.271 0.173 0.081 
Own >1.69 Acres Land 0.389 0.196 0.079 0.314 0.227 0.167 
Economic Status Index -0.992 0.242 1.503 6093.319 12819.8 31282.32 
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Figure 1. School enrolment (%) by age. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Kernel density estimates of school expenditure  
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Endnotes: 
                                                 
i
 Based on the budgetary outlay of education and health sectors in the fiscal year of 2010-
2011 (National Budget Report, Ministry of Finance). 
ii
 The adult literacy rate of the country as estimated from the Population and Housing Census 
(2005) reveals a 20% lower level for females suggesting the existence of gender-biased 
preferences for educational investment.  
iii
 See, for example, Kingdon, 2005, Aslam & Kingdon, 2008, Himaz, 2010, Zimmermann, 
2012). While Zimmermann (2012) and Kingdon (2005), and Aslam & Kingdon (2008) 
confirm the existence of a preference for spending on educating boys in India and Pakistan, 
respectively, the reverse is found in Sri-Lanka where both the preference and allocation of 
educational expense favour girls (Himaz, 2010). 
iv
 For instance, a pro-male bias may exist in the decision of households to spend on the 
child’s education, while households may be pro-female in the amount spent, indicating an 
opposite bias in the second stage of the decision-making process of resource allocation by 
households. 
v
 It must be noted that this strategy only controls for limited form of endogeneity attributable 
to intra-household resource allocation patterns. Addressing the concerns for other sources of 
potential endogeneity constitute an important avenue for future research but are outside the 
scope of the current paper. 
vi
 Further details of the survey design can be found in the NSB (2007). 
vii
 Parents of disadvantaged children may incur zero expenses due to fee waivers. Given that 
less than 2% of children in our sample fall in this category, the log transformation has 
minimal effect on the sample size.  
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viii
 The US$ equivalent of our sample average schooling expenditure is $36 (approx.).  It 
amounts to roughly 7% of private consumption expenditure as reported by the NSB (2011).  
We omit observations that report more than Nu. 15000 (80% of consumption expenditure) 
annual schooling expenses.  
ix
 On the contrary, Chernichovsky & Oey (1985) find a positive association between the 
number of school-going age children in a household and school enrolment in Botswana. They 
suggest, with more children available, only some are needed for farm work, freeing others to 
attend school. 
x
 According to Figures 1 and 2 in the appendix showing kernel density estimates of school 
expenditures in levels and logs, respectively, educational expenditure seems to be log-
normally distributed in our sample. 
xi
 Since less than 2% of enrolled children incur zero expenses in our study, positive enrolment 
decision is treated as equivalent to incurring positive expenditures.  
xii
 While a Hausman test (not reported here but available upon request) implies that fixed 
effects is ideal to estimate the enrolment decision, the probit model does not lend itself to a 
fixed effects treatment (Baltagi, 1995). An alternative is provided in Greene (2004), but due 
to its technical complexity it is outside the scope of the current paper. Hence we resort to a 
random effects model in the first stage. 
xiii
 We find a relatively large number of live-in-servants reside in households with college 
educated heads.  These servants are also more likely to be females when compared to the 
households with non-educated heads.  For example, 80% of live-in-servants in the 6-16 age 
group are females. Almost 8% of households with college educated heads have live-in-
servants (of which 11% are females) as compared to only 0.5% for households with non-
educated heads (of which only 0.6% are females). On dropping the live-in-servants from the 
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estimation sample, the negative marginal effect of college educated heads falls to -0.025 and 
becomes insignificant. 
xiv
 Following a referee’s comment, we examine the possibility of boys being sent to better 
quality schools that may not be reflected in higher expenditures.  We test for significant 
differences in various measures of school quality across gender.  These include private 
schooling, availability of books and supplies, teacher absenteeism, teacher competence, 
relevance of the teaching program, and student-teacher ratio.  The t-statistics for mean 
differences are not rejected in any case. 
xv
 Additionally we estimate a truncated normal regression for the expenditure equation 
(Cragg, 1971).  Results are qualitatively same as the lognormal model. 
xvi
 In the absence of interactions of the female dummy with the age groups, the gender gap is 
-9% and significant at the 1% level.  These results are not presented here for space 
considerations but are available from the authors upon request. 
xvii
 In keeping with the results reported for the fixed effects models in columns (l) and (3), we 
include estimates for the interaction terms only for the random effects model in column (2). 
  
 
 
 
 
